

EXHIBIT T

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NANOPIERCE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
a Nevada Corporation; STEPHEN SEITZ,
an individual; JANE SEITZ, an individual;
KATHY KNIGHT-MCCONNELL, an
individual; JAMES STOCK, an individual;
MAUREEN O’SULLIVAN, an individual;
and HELEN KOLADA, an individual,

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 45364

DISTRICT COURT
CASE NO. CV04-01079

Appellants,

vs.

THE DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARING
CORPORATION; THE DEPOSITORY TRUST
COMPANY; AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITIES CLEARING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

**BRIEF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
AMICUS CURIAE, ON THE ISSUE ADDRESSED**

JACOB H. STILLMAN
Solicitor

MARK PENNINGTON
Assistant General Counsel

MICHAEL L. POST
Senior Counsel

(Pursuant to Nev. S. Ct. R. 43)

Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F St. NE
Washington, DC 20549-8010
(202) 551-5194 (Post)

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1 returned. Id. Borrowed stock is returned to the lender through normal allocation
2 in the continuous net settlement system as securities become available. Id.
3 Alternatively, the lender, as any other member with a long position, may initiate
4 buy-in procedures by submitting a Notice of Intention to Buy-in. Until the
5 securities are returned, the lending member no longer has ownership rights in
6 them, and therefore cannot sell or re-lend them.

7 **4. Plaintiffs' incorrect descriptions of important aspects of the**
8 **Continuous Net Settlement system and the Stock Borrow**
9 **Program**

10 This summary of the applicable NSCC rules makes clear that plaintiffs'
11 descriptions of the continuous net settlement system and the stock borrow program
12 are flawed in important respects. Among their erroneous allegations are that (1)
13 the stock borrow program is the only way that fails to deliver can be cured, (2)
14 NSCC is at fault for not requiring buy-ins, and (3) the stock borrow program
15 results in the creation of phantom securities.

16 *First*, a receiving member that has failed to receive securities can obtain
17 those securities through a buy-in that does not involve the stock borrow program
18 at all.

19 *Second*, NSCC does not have the authority to require buy-ins. As noted, its
20 role in the stock borrow program is automated and non-discretionary -- the only

1 entity authorized by the rules to require a buy-in is the receiving member. If a
2 long position remains open for an extended period of time, that is because the
3 receiving member has not initiated a buy-in, presumably because that member is
4 willing to rely on the fact that it will eventually be allocated securities pursuant to
5 NSCC's procedures. These statements are true whether the entity that is owed
6 securities is the original purchaser who did not receive delivery, or a firm that has
7 loaned securities to the stock borrow program.

8 Furthermore, NSCC has no mechanism for determining whether particular
9 fails to deliver have occurred because of illegal naked short selling or for some
10 legitimate reason. Nor are there any standards or rules that would guide its
11 discretion in deciding whether to make a buy-in, if it were to undertake do so. In
12 short, the assertion that NSCC is in some way culpable for failing to initiate buy-
13 ins is contrary to the clear terms of the Rules.

14 *Third* and finally, neither the continuous net settlement system nor the stock
15 borrow program creates artificial securities. The number of securities issued and
16 outstanding is determined by the security issuer and is reflected in the issuer's
17 records of registered ownership; nothing that happens in the course of clearing and
18 settling trades, including any action taken by NSCC, can change that number.

1 As explained above, the continuous net settlement system is essentially an
2 accounting system that records delivery and receive obligations among NSCC
3 members. These obligations do not reflect *ownership positions*. Ownership
4 positions, as opposed to the deliver and receive obligations recorded by NSCC, are
5 reflected on the records of DTC.

6 The security's issuer maintains its own record of all of the registered
7 ownership positions of its securities. All shares deposited at DTC are recorded on
8 the issuer's records in the name of DTC's nominee, Cede & Co., and constitute
9 some or all of the issuer's securities issued and outstanding. The fact that
10 securities settle through the continuous net settlement system, or that they are
11 deposited at DTC, does not increase the number of the issuer's shares.

12 As to the stock borrow program, as noted above and as further explained by
13 the Commission's staff in guidance on the Commission's website, the securities
14 loaned by NSCC members for use in the program must be on deposit at DTC, and
15 are debited from members' accounts when the securities are used to make delivery.
16 See Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding SHO (Jan. 3, 2005),
17 <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm>. Once a member's
18 securities are used for delivery to another member, the lending member no longer

1 has ownership rights in those securities, which means that it cannot sell or re-lend
2 them until such time as the securities are returned to its DTC account.

3 When securities are not available to be loaned through the the stock borrow
4 program, the buyer is required to either wait for delivery or initiate a buy-in.
5 Neither waiting nor buying-in increases the number of issued and outstanding
6 securities. All that the stock borrow program does is shift the *consequences* of the
7 failure to deliver from a buyer that has not affirmatively indicated a willingness to
8 wait for delivery of its securities to a lender that *has* indicated that it is willing to
9 wait. This shift cannot possibly increase the number of securities issued, any more
10 than the buyer's decision to either wait or initiate a buy-in can do so. Therefore,
11 plaintiffs' assertion that the stock borrow program creates securities is incorrect.⁶
12

⁶ While the number of securities outstanding does not change because of the clearance and settlement system, the aggregate number of positions reflected in customer accounts at broker-dealers may in fact be greater than the number of securities issued and outstanding. This is due in part to the fact that, as noted above, broker-dealers may credit customer accounts with securities entitlements in anticipation of delivery of the security to the broker-dealer.